56 pages • 1 hour read
Studs TerkelA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Summary
Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Introduction
Book 1, Section 1
Book 1, Section 2
Book 1, Section 3
Book 1, Section 4
Book 1, Section 5
Book 1, Section 6
Book 1, Section 7
Book 2, Section 1
Book 2, Section 2
Book 2, Section 3
Book 2, Section 4
Book 2, Section 5
Book 3, Section 1
Book 3, Section 2
Book 3, Section 3
Book 3, Section 4
Book 4, Section 1
Book 4, Section 2
Book 4, Section 3
Book 4, Section 4
Book 4, Section 5
Book 4, Section 6
Epilogue
Key Figures
Themes
Symbols & Motifs
Important Quotes
Essay Topics
Tools
As shown by the use of quotation marks in the title, the first question Studs Terkel raises is whether World War II was a “good war,” as it is often presented in history textbooks. On one hand, the war was fought against fascism and Nazi Germany, a government that aggressively promoted theories of racial supremacy and anti-Semitism, and perpetrated the Holocaust. On the other hand, the war had its share of horrors and injustices, as the United States tolerated racist practices like segregation in the military, and the Allies committed arguably unnecessary atrocities like bombing of the German city of Dresden. Then there is the matter of how World War II changed history. It brought about an era of economic prosperity for Americans and was important in laying the groundwork for the civil rights and women’s rights movements of the 1960s, but it also bequeathed the specter of nuclear war on later generations and anti-communist zealotry in the United States in the form of the McCarthyism, which ruined many innocent lives.
Then, of course, there are the broader philosophical and ethical questions. Is any war truly just or good? Can a war be necessary but still not good or just? Such questions only lead to more specific issues that are still debated today, like the necessity and morality of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the fact that the Allies returned South Asian countries liberated from Japanese occupation to European colonial rule. None of Terkel’s interviewees—or Terkel himself, for that matter—offer easy answers to any of these questions.
One of Studs Terkel’s main concerns is not just whether the past is remembered, but how the past is remembered. For him, the past is both the accumulation of facts and the diverse impressions and reactions that can influence how people experience the present. This is shown in Paul Edwards’s observation that immediately after World War II, while most of the world was still suffering, Americans had new wealth and leisure activities, but this difference is “forgotten now” (573).
The question of historical memory is especially important when it comes to World War II, given the stark differences between the era just before and during the war and the eras that followed. The United States was a less prosperous and less cosmopolitan country. It was possibly this lack of awareness of the poverty and struggles of the past that made Americans more materialistic in the present. Likewise, the optimism and solidarity of World War II, even though it was contradicted by the institutional racism still prevalent in the period, stands in contrast to the pessimism, fear, and skepticism of more recent eras, especially in light of the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the prospect of an apocalyptic nuclear war.
“The Good War” often highlights the tension between preconceived notions and assumptions, sometimes even endorsed by governments, and the experiences and shared humanity of soldiers and civilians alike. This is best illustrated in the camaraderie that existed between Russians and Americans during World War II, which was discouraged by the US government once the Cold War truly started. Further, there are accounts of Americans feeling empathy for the Japanese, both in Japan and in the United States, where Japanese Americans were sent to internment camps. There are also exceptions, like Jacques Raboud, who acted in revenge against a group of SS men for a fallen friend: “All the hate came back” (422).
Nonetheless, some of these accounts, especially those of soldiers and sailors who lived in enemy territory, illustrate incidents where soldiers felt sympathy for German and Japanese civilians, even soldiers. People’s capacity for empathy toward other human beings—even in wartime, despite geopolitical boundaries and conflicts—is a recurring theme in Terkel’s narratives.
So while Terkel’s interviewees often refer to propaganda’s influence even in a democratic society, they also highlight propaganda’s limits. Propaganda was pervasive during World War II, presented even in more benign forms like the comic strip Terry and the Pirates. However, it was constantly challenged and even openly mocked in everyday life. In one anecdote from Dellie Hahne, a movie audience reacted to one bit of unconvincing propaganda with laughter: “’Cause they know you can feed ’em only so much bullshit” (120).
Terkel’s interviewees sometimes revisit the notion that the United States is historically unique in being a nation that has not experienced the horrors of war. As Peter Bezich puts it, “People in America do not know what war is…The Russians know. The Polish know. The Jewish know. But the American people have no idea what all-out war is” (83). With the exception of the attack on Pearl Harbor, even World War II was no exception. This is not to say many Americans did not experience loss from the deaths of relatives and friends who fought in the war, but the United States was not devastated to nearly the same extent as Europe and East Asia. Consequently, people like Jack Short found that World War II “changed our whole idea of how we wanted to live when we came back” (144).
At the same time, though, a sense of innocence was lost as a result of the horrors of World War II, such as the Holocaust and the use of the atomic bomb. About her toddler-age niece, Debbie Cooney—herself a teenager—remarks, “I want her to be able to live and go out in the country and just breathe without having to worry or anything” (586). Nor was the optimism of World War II restored by the Korean and Vietnam Wars, neither of which had a simple and comprehensible sense of purpose, such as fighting against fascism.