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49 pages 1 hour read

David Graeber

Debt: The First 5,000 Years

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2011

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Chapters 11-12Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 11 Summary: “Age of the Great Capitalist Empires”

In Chapter 11, Graeber focuses on the “age of the great capitalist empires,” a period between 1450-1971 CE. While “all the Axial Age pieces reappeared” (308), they merged in completely new ways. The era begins with the return of coinage. Gold and silver poured into Europe because of the conquest of North America. While some sources suggest this led to the massive inflation of the 1500s and 1600s, Graeber takes issue with this claim. To him, the problem with this conventional story is that most of the metal ended up in China. Illegal mines cropped up in China at the end of the 15th century. The government, which was already suspicious of merchants, attempted to shut down the mines. These efforts sparked local insurrections, causing the government to stop “trying to suppress the inform economy” (310). Instead, the Chinese government legalized the mines and adopted coinage for taxation. The economy boomed and population increased, resulting in an even greater demand for metal. Europeans met this demand with metal from the Americas, which Graeber suggests is the reason for the success of the colonization of North America. Governments in Europe caused inflation “by insisting that gold and silver were money” (313), which undermined local systems of trust that had operated without metal currency.

Graeber turns to exploring exactly what is capitalism. He starts with one of the most infamous conquistadors, Hernán Cortés, and his soldiers. Graeber suggests that these men were motivated not by greed, but by a financial system centered on debt with unforgiving policies. Much of the Aztec wealth went to the imperial treasury. As a result, the soldiers, despite facing grueling warfare and death in Mexico, ended up with very little money to show for their efforts. Around this time, Spanish merchants arrived in Mexico, charging the soldiers exorbitant prices for necessities. Soldiers saw their debt increase. When these soldiers lead local administrations, tax collections, and labor regimes they treated the Indigenous peoples poorly because of their frantic need to pay down their debts and their “outrage at the idea that, after all they had gone through, they should be held to owe anything to begin with” (318).

Graeber uses Cortés to highlight the issues of capitalism. Cortés was beholden to his financiers, yet these financiers were too far away to monitor his actions. Cortés had to send some of his conquest to the King of Spain. He was also bad at managing his money. Thus, he was trapped in this vicious cycle of “attempting to use his conquests to acquire plunder, and enslaved people to work the mines with which he could pay his soldiers and suppliers cash to embark on even further conquests” (320). Institutions and people become centered on profit, which marks a radical departure from anything we have seen before in history. Money is no longer a political instrument, but its own autonomous force.

To Graeber, the origins of capitalism are about “how an economy of credit was converted into an economy of interest” (332). He posits that this transition began with the legalization of interest and the criminalization of debt. Laws began to impose harsh penalties on debtors. Creditors started to scheme, manipulate, and even bribe law officials to get their debtors into trouble. People started to mistrust virtual credit and the use of coinage was seen “as moral in itself” (335). Communities became rife with suspicion and animosity. Moral and religious thinkers started to use the notion of self-interest to describe human nature.

The disappearance of coins from European markets also brought about modern capitalism. In the 17th century, philosophers such as John Locke argued that metal made coins intrinsically valuable. When the value of silver had risen so high that British coins were worth less than their silver content, Locke and others proposed that “the only recourse was to recall the currency and restrike it at exactly the same value that it had before” (341). The results of this plan were disastrous. Coinage disappeared from circulation, prices of goods and services increased, wages shrank, and there was hunger and unrest among the populace. Despite this, most economists at the time accepted Locke’s position acting like “gold and silver were money” (341).

Chapter 12 Summary: “The Beginning of Something Yet to be Determined”

Graeber associates the beginning of the current phase of financial history with President Richard Nixon taking the US dollar off the gold standard in 1971. The reason that Nixon did this was because the US was facing a debt crisis due to its military activities in Vietnam. Nixon converted the US dollar into “pure ‘fiat money’—mere pieces of paper, intrinsically worthless, that were treated as money only because the United States government insisted that they should be” (364-5). The global community returned to using virtual currency.

With the return of virtual currency, history tells us we should see greater stability and peace and a “return to relations of honor and trust” (368). Graeber notes that so far this has not occurred. Military power (primarily the US) controls the new global currency even more than before. Graeber even suggests that the US has imposed a tax on the global community by making other countries rely on its treasury bonds.

Creditors also face greater protections compared to debtors (we should see the opposite with the return to virtual money). International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies continue to demand repayment of loans from emerging countries. The people of these countries, rather than their corrupt leaders who took out the loans, often face the burden of repayment. In response to these unjust policies, there has been an increase in social unrest in many of these countries. Graeber emphasizes that this new financial order continues to preserve and even worsen the imbalances we saw at the height of capitalist empires.

Graeber also discusses the two cycles of popular movements since World War II. The first (1945-1978) demanded the rights of all national citizens to have economic security. At this time, only certain groups (mainly the white working class of the North Atlantic countries) had access to unions, social benefits, public educational institutions, and increasing wages. Minority groups in countries around the world demanded these same rights. During the 1970s, Graeber suggests that things reached a breaking point. More and more people realized that capitalism cannot extend the promise of economic security to everyone.

This crisis led to the second movement (1978-2008), which focused on who has access to capitalism itself. Governments were not able to continue increasing wages, so they encouraged people to “buy a piece of capitalism” (376). Credit cards came out of this idea. Once again though, the system reached a breaking point since capitalism is “ultimately a system of power and exclusion” (381).

Despite Graeber’s pessimism with capitalism, he does believe that it is possible to free ourselves from this system. To do so, we need to change our thinking around the morality of debt. People need to stop seeing themselves as financial pillagers who eye “the world simply for what can be turned into money” (389). We also need to stop listening to the financial imperatives that suggest only those who are willing to pillage “deserve access to the resources required to pursue anything in life other than money” (390). If we continue down this path, then we are likely to see our own demise given that humans are coming up against the planet’s social and ecological limits.

Chapters 11-12 Analysis

In the final two chapters of Debt, Graeber presents evidence that provides a fresh approach to the last five hundred years dominated by capitalist empires. He hopes readers begin to ask themselves about what really is at stake in the present day with the new financial order.

As one example, Graeber focuses on how interest-bearing loans (which have come and gone over the last 5000 years) came to be part of capitalism. At the beginning of the age of capitalism, religious philosophers such as Martin Luther were calling for the ban on interest-bearing loans. While this position won him enormous popularity in towns and villages, his sermons inspired even more radical reformers who questioned the legitimacy of the aristocracy and private property. Social unrest ensued. Luther eventually changed his opinion arguing that reasonable interest rates were not sinful for two reasons. The first is that they represent “compensation for the money that the lender would have made had he been able to place his money in some more profitable investment” (322-3). The second is the lending is something one practices on strangers. This notion is incredibly insidious in nature since it means that people can treat even their neighbors as strangers when conducting transactions.

These two notions have fed into our psychology of debt. For many people, it is difficult to pay off debt with interest, which further compounds their debt. People try and get more money to pay down debt, but fail. Thus, they are stuck in a perpetual cycle of debt and feel great bitterness and anger. Graeber describes this psychology as “the debtor who feels he has done nothing to deserve being placed in his position: the frantic urgency of having to convert everything around oneself into money, and rage and indignation at having been reduced to the sort of person who would do so” (325).

While most people detest debt, Graeber suggests that capitalism survives because of it. In fact, the entire period of the great age of capitalist empires centers on debt. In the early portion of the period, kings borrowed money to finance their empire’s expansion. The proceeds from these colonial ventures were then used to pay for European wars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Throughout this age, government policies and prisons extracted labor and money from the population.

Graeber strongly believes that our current financial order will implode if we continue to rely on debt, in part because of credit cards. Credit cards allow people to make money out of nothing. People all around the world have been able to use credit cards to improve their standards of living by buying non-essential goods for themselves and their families. However, we cannot keep making money forever since “it is impossible to maintain an engine of perpetual economic growth forever on a finite planet” (382). At some point, governments will need to decide who has the power to make money since capitalism is a system of power and exclusion. In fact, this recently did happen. The US government in the wake of the Great Recession had to decide whether financiers or ordinary citizens would benefit from capitalism. They chose financiers by bailing them out with taxpayer money and leaving ordinary citizen to deal with bankruptcy. This decision drives home to Graeber that our current financial arrangements are not viable in the long term.

In the concluding chapter, Graeber is hopeful that we can free ourselves from the current system. He urges readers to reassess their beliefs around debt and freedom, since we are not truly free with debt. He also encourages readers to think outside the box when it comes to imagining how we get to a place that will allow us to see the sorts of promises genuinely free men and women might make to one another.

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